

AN ESTIMATE OF THE MILITARY SITUATION

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1. Soviet Military Might.

a. Ground Forces. The Russian Army, with about 200 peacetime divisions but which can be expanded without difficulty to some 475 divisions in time of war, has a towering superiority over all armies of the West. Its strength is such that it can initiate offensives simultaneously against Western Europe (to the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts and Scandinavia) and the Near East (Suez and the Persian Gulf areas). Moreover, a strong group (approximately 30 divisions) is assembled and ready in East Germany and Poland. The Soviets can move at any time. Their objectives will be: the Atlantic coast from Narvik to Bordeaux; the Mediterranean area to Italy, inclusive; and a line from the Suez Canal to the Persian Gulf. Thereafter, they may be expected to strive for Spain and North Africa.

b. Naval Forces. The Russian Navy is difficult to appraise. It is certain that emphasis has been placed on submarines. The number available to the Soviets is somewhere between 200 and 300; and 80 to 100 additional, modern subs can be forecast. The Soviet submarine arms is in a difficult position vis-a-vis the Western Powers. Its objective must be to fight its way quickly out of the Baltic (between Denmark and Sweden), out of the Black Sea (through the Dardanelles), and out of the Mediterranean (via the Suez Canal). It is doubtful that, at present, the Soviets are in a position to conduct widely scattered submarine warfare on the German pattern. Moreover, they have no predilection for such operations, and they lack experience in them.

c. Air Forces. During World War II, the Soviet Air Force was the stepchild of Russian armed might, but it has been built up since 1945. The first objective was development of a strong air defense (fighter planes and radar). With some 4,000 jet aircraft, at this time, and a

well-planned radar net, the Soviets are well on the way to preparedness. An efficient defense system against an eventual attacker must be anticipated. At the same time, a tactical air force, including paratroops, is being built up. There is no doubt that the Soviet Air Force can give all needed support to their land operations, and certainly can make wide use of air landings and paratroop drops. The second big objective is creation of an offensive air fleet. This is underway, but the Russians are still not in a position to conduct large-scale air operations. They lack material strength, organization, and experience. When this situation will be overcome is hard to estimate. One must reckon that the Soviets are doing everything in their power to neutralize the lead of the West.

d. Atomic Development. Nobody knows how far advanced the development of atomic weapons is in the USSR. It is certain that the Soviets possess the atomic weapon, that they have recognized its importance, and will push its development and production with all means at their disposal.

2. Armed Might of the West.

a. Ground Forces. The armies of the West are hopelessly inferior to those of the Russians. Practically nothing has been done since the war to change this situation. It is really grotesque that, in Europe, the Swiss Army should today be the strongest! The Soviets would easily annihilate these pitiful ground forces. They (the Soviets) can be at the Rhine in two days, and at the Pyrenees in fourteen, because they would not have to fight but merely march. After World War II, the German generals were pilloried for having prepared too much for war. It is hoped that, in a new war, the Western European generals will not be condemned for having prepared too little for defense.

b. Naval Forces. The navies of the Western Powers are superior to those of the Soviets. They will be fully capable of fulfilling their missions in war. Furthermore, they need not fear any particular threat

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from Russian submarines. This situation may change with the passage of time.

c. Air Forces. The Anglo-American Air Forces are, at present clearly superior to those of the Russians. They have three distinct advantages: (1) superior technique, (2) deep-seated experience in aerial warfare, and (3) an advantageous strategic air position in Europe and the Near East. The Soviets are beginning to overhaul the technical advantage of the West, so it will take every effort by the Western Powers to maintain their advantage. For a long while, experience will still be a factor in favor of the West. The strategic air position, however, must not be lost, as this could be decisive in a future war. These facts cannot be basically altered, even by the West's atomic weapons. Also, this weapon cannot, by itself, decide the war. It is only one of many weapons -- even if a particularly effective one -- that we have encountered in the history of warfare. Pyrrhus' elephants, the first firearms, the breech-loading rifle, the tank, gases, and the rocket, all appeared, in turn, to be the decisive factor in war -- but they were not. Only by the coordinated use of all weapons may results be achieved in the future. There is also another question: Who is more vulnerable to the atom bomb -- Russia or America? Unfortunately, America is. Concentrations of population in America's large cities, concentrations of industries, and (this must not be overlooked either) the vulnerability of the people to destructive attacks, are greater than in Russia. To bring Russia to capitulation with the atomic bomb alone is wishful thinking. That regime will never give up, though millions of its inhabitants may die, so long as no American soldier's foot treads Russian soil. Russia must be conquered!

3. Military Conclusions for the West. From this two-sided examination of the power potentials, the following are the basic points of view for the West:

a. Positions now held by the Western Powers in the Near East and Europe must be held in case of war. If these positions are lost, the West

will be deprived of favorable bases for successful air operations against Russia. The loss of these bases can hardly be compensated for by strong-points of the Anglo-American air forces located farther away: at least, not at present. Once the Russians reach the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Suez Canal, the air bases in North Africa, Spain, and England will be seriously endangered. Furthermore, the possibility of invading the territories than occupied by the Soviets will be infinitely more difficult than the invasion of Europe was in 1944. Where and when it (the invasion) would be practical is difficult to say; in any case, not for years. At this time, the defense of European-Near Asian areas by the Soviets is being built up to the maximum, and the occupied territories will be used for this purpose (defense of Russia proper) until the last moment.

b. The most important strategic areas within the position to be held are: Iran, the Dardanelles, the front along the Tagliamento River, the Alps, the Rhine, and Denmark-South Sweden. If the West holds these key positions, it protects its air bases therewith and, at the same time, its possible positions for the counteroffensive. This counteroffensive could take the form of a narrow pincer movement, from the Alps-Tagliamento area on one side and from the Danish area on the other, with the main effort in the general direction of Poland, with the objective of regaining Europe. It could also, from the adjoining Near East and from Northern Sweden, drive into inner Russia with the greater objective of bringing about the downfall of Russia itself.

c. These above-named key positions can only be held by purposeful planning in the nearest possible future. The air forces of the West have, therefore, the task of building up their basic organizations ever more, and by the threat of their constant preparedness and superiority, frighten the Soviets out of resorting to preventive war. Time is necessary for planning and the preparation of ground defenses. This defense must be planned entirely

differently from the way it has been done up to now. Every European country must have its own definite task within the over-all planning, (i.e., Italy, the Tagliamento front, France, the Rhine front, etc.). Also, each country should draw from the American Military Aid Program only such weapons as are most necessary for its particular problem. Above all, the USA should direct everything strictly. Otherwise, the plan will misfire.

d. America is today in an entirely different situation than (it was) in 1916 and 1941. From the very first day of the war, it stands in the front line. It cannot wait until its armament-producing machinery is running at full speed. It must, from the first day, apply its entire military power. Therefore, it devolves upon the Air Force to deliver the decisive blow, with the atomic weapon playing a particularly important role in this case.

4. Political Factors. The foregoing short study of the military situation would not be complete without a brief estimate of the political situation in Europe. It provides the key to the answer to the militarily decisive question: Will the Soviets resort to a preventive war, and when? The political situation in European countries is unstable. Certainly the danger of Bolshevism has been recognized, but the governments are not strong enough to take the necessary measures to deal with it ruthlessly. They fear that they would thereby provoke the Soviets. The Russians know this situation. They know that their underground work in Europe is going ahead very promisingly. They see, furthermore, that the rearming of the European states is going so slowly that, in the foreseeable future, a basic change in the military status in Europe is not to be feared by them. Time is also in their favor.

So long as the Russians can hold this estimate they will not resort to a preventive war. In short, only when they become afraid that their underground work will no longer bring results, and that the West is becoming

too strong militarily, will the danger of a military attack come to the foreground again. Against an imminent preventive war on the part of the Russians, we may speak further about the time: the air defense of the Soviets is not yet ready; they are just beginning to build up their submarine weapon; and the development of atomic weapons is lagging. The West, therefore, has a measured period of time for its countermeasures. To foresee and speedily exploit this period it is the holy duty of all freedom-loving peoples. The example of Korea gives much to think about. Here the available time was not used to good advantage, as it should have been. The Soviets simply saw their chance and used it without scruple. May Europe be spared a similar fate!

Si vis pacem para bellum - Freely translated, very freely: In time of peace, prepare for war.